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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
WEBER BASIN WATER CONSER-
VANCY DISTRICT, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
WILLARD A. SKEEN, JOHN G. 
BRAEGGER, ELSIE L. BRAEG-
GER, his wife, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
8803 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
JOHN G. AND ELSIE L. BRAEGGER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts as related by appellant is suf-
ficiently accurate that we can see no need to take issue as 
to those facts. We do not, of course, draw the same infer-
ences nor the same conclusions from those facts. In con-
nection with our argument under each of the points, we 
will need to refer for purpose of emphasis to some of the 
facts of this case. We shall refrain from mentioning them 
further here in order to avoid duplication. 
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STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
THE ENTIRE RECORD WILL NOT SUPPORT 
THE CONTENTIQN THAT EXCESSIVE DAM-
AGES WERE AWARDED BY THE JURY 
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PAS-
SIO:t'~ OR PREJUDICE. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAM-
AGE TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT 
TAKEN. 
POINT III. 
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT GIVEN IN 
VIOLATION OF RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF 
CIVIL . PROCEDURE AND ERROR CANNOT 
BE PREDICATED ON THE ADMONISHMENTS 
GIVEN THE JURY BY THE COURT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ENTIRE RECORD WILL NOT SUPPORT 
THE CONTENTION THAT EXCESSIVE DAM-
AGES WERE AWARDED BY THE JURY 
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF PAS-
S ION OR PREJUDICE. 
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3 
The appellant has devoted pages 6 through 14 of his 
brief to quote questions asked by the jury and the answers 
of the trial court and of counsel. The excerpts are properly 
quoted but we do desire to add these additional statements. 
On page 11 of appellant's brief, there is a quotation 
from page 187 of the record that concludes with the Court's 
statement: "I guess that's a fair statement." The record 
then continues (R. 187). 
"Mr. Skeen : I think so. 
"The Court: I thought I should make that ex-
planation so that you will understand there's no 
secrets. This is the first case involving the Willard 
Basin, which is, as far as my experience is concerned, 
a pioneer first kind of case. We've had many State 
Road Commission cases. Several of them were taken 
to the Supreme Court, or at least one of them involv-
ing the Willard people when the highway was wid-
ened before the war down there, you recall. Well, 
I guess there's no harm as far as I've gone. 
"Mr Mason : I guess not. 
"The Court: I could pry the lid off and we'd 
all be quarreling here, but it's been so peaceful this 
morning, I don't want to get anything started here. 
Now, is one-thirty all right? Thank you very much. 
Usual admonition." · 
* * * * 
On page 14 of appellant's brief, Juror Rich is quoted 
as saying, "Well, we need more evidence", and page 341 
of the record continues by the Court taking a half-hour 
recess. Immediately, upon reconvening, the following state-
ment is addressed to the jury by the Court (R. 341) : 
"The Court: Mrs. Rich and gentlemen, with re-
gard to the question asked before we recessed, the 
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only answer the court can give you is. to refer you to 
the instruction which sets forth how to measure the 
damages, and that instruction, ladies and gentlemen, 
has been approved by not only the Supreme Court 
of our state but practically every state in the union 
in these kinds of cases. I make the further comment, 
we never try a. lawsuit where the evidence is perfect. 
We have to try it on the evidence as presented. Now, 
for reasons deemed sufficient to the Court and sat-
isfactory to the parties, this case will have to be de-
cided on the evidence that you've heard. That's the 
rules of the game. It can't be any other way. So if 
you'll read the instructions over carefully. I don't 
claim credit for coining the phrases. We've got 
them out of the law books, and it's the best way to 
do it. It's the American system. It's the only way 
we can do it. Anybody have any further sugges-
tions? 
"Mr. Skeen : No. 
"And counsel then proceed with their argu-
ments to the jury." 
"The right of a juror to ask questions of a witness 
during trial is cle-arly within the sound discretion of the 
trial court." State v. Sheppard (Ohio), 128 N. E. 2d 471. 
In State v. Anderson, 108 Utah 130, 158 P. 2d 127, the 
Supreme Court of Utah stated: 
"During the course of the trial the court asked 
the jury if it would like to ask some questions of a 
witness. Two members of the jury accepted this 
invitation. Appellants assign this invitation by the 
court to the jurors to ask questions as error. Appel-
lants concede that it is not error for a court to grant 
permission to a juror who wishes to ask questions 
to clarify some material point in the evidence, but 
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insist that it is error for the court to · invite the 
jurors to ask such questions. Whether. a juror will 
be permitted to ask questions of a witness is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court. * * * 
The fact that the trial court granted the jurors per-
mission to ask questions of witnesses without any 
special request from them for this privilege does 
not, in our opinion, in and of itself constitute error. 
The determining factors as to whether error has 
been committed is the type of questions asked and 
allowed to be answered. If the questions asked are 
not germane to the issues involved or are such as 
would be clearly improper and therefore prejudicial 
to the rights of the defendants to a fair and im-
partial trial, the court's allowing them to be an-
swered would be error. As stated in Jones' Commen-
taries on Evidence, 2nd Ed. Vol. 5, Page 4539, Sec. 
2320: 'The privilege of examining witnesses is ex-
tended to jurors and may be exercised by them to 
draw out or clear up an uncertain point in the testi-
mony. It has even been said that jurors should be 
encouraged to ask questions. They should not, how-
ever, be permitted to take the examination of wit-
nesses out of the hands of counsel and to question 
witnesses at length, nor should they be permitted 
to interrupt the orderly conduct of the cause with 
unnecessary questions.' " 
And the Court continued, after noting the substance· of the 
questions asked by the jurors. 
"These questions might properly have been elici-
ted on the direct examination of the witness and 
were such as would clarify material points in the 
testimony. The court, therefore, did not err in per-
mitting these questions to be answered. By so hold-
ing, this court does not wish it to be understood that 
it approves the practice of a trial court inviting 
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jurors to ask questions. This privilege sh-ould only 
be granted when in the sound discretion of the court 
it appears that it will aid a juror in understanding 
some material issue involved in the case and ordi-
narily when some juror has indicated that he wishes 
such a point· clarified." (Emphasis added.) 
The action of the jury in the present case fully meets 
the language of the foregoing statement that we have itali-
cized. It is certainly far less objectionable that a juror 
should request guidance from the court than to secure fur-
ther evidence from the witness; and appellant makes no 
claim that the answers given to these questions by the 
Court were anything but proper. 
We should note that at no time during the trial of this 
cause, either in the presence or in the absence of the jury, 
was any complaint made or any objection noted to these 
questions by the jury or the answers by the Court. It is 
not proper to raise such a question for the first time upon 
motion for a new trial and upon appeal. And we must fur-
ther note that no point is made that the verdict of the jury 
was excessive. 
We respectfully urge that the action of the jurors and 
of the trial court was entirely proper. The jurors sought 
information that the Court properly supplied. To now 
claim that these jurors did not follow the admonishments 
and instructions of the trial court strikes at the very foun-
dation of the American system of trial by jury, and would, 
if upheld, permit any litigant who lost in the trial court 
to inferentially claim and contend that the jury did not 
obey and follow the admonishments and instructions of the 
trial court. 
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Appellant claims that excessive damages appear to 
have been given under the influence of passion or prejudice. 
We have demonstrated that no passion or prejudice is 
shown to have existed as far as the jury was concerned, 
and we very strenuously contend that there has been a 
complete failure by appellant to show that the damages 
awarded were excessive. 
POINT II. 
THERE IS COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO SUP-
PORT THE AWARD FOR SEVERANCE DAM-
AGE TO THE 36.79 ACRES OF LAND NOT 
TAKEN. 
Appellant contends that the stipulation entered into 
and recited on page 20 of appellant's brief negatived re-
spondent's right to severance damage for this s,pecific parcel 
of land. We must, of course, take issue with him; and we 
believe that the answer is self-evident when this Court re-
views the facts of the case. Respondents had a farming 
and livestock operation and the approximate 175 acres 
were used as a farm unit. To take 137 acres away and pay 
only the value of those acres would be manifestly unfair. 
There is of necessity a diminution in per acre value when 
a farm is reduced from a large acreage to a small acreage. 
The stipulation recited in appellant's brief operated to 
substantially reduce the severance damage to the 36.79 
acres not taken, and the jury certainly viewed it as such 
when they allowed only $1850.00 damages for this sever-
ance. 
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The trial court gave Instruction No. 10 (R. 33), which 
reads: as .follows : 
· "The property sought to be condemned consti-
, tutes only a part of the land holdings of the defen-
dants, . all parts of which have been operated as a 
unit for farming and livestock operation purposes. 
You are instructed that you may include in the just 
compensation to be awarded the defendants, the 
damages, if any, which will accrue to the portion 
not sought to be condemned by reason of its sever-
ance from the portion sought to be condemned and 
the construction of the improvement in the manner 
proposed by the plaintiff. In arriving at such dam-
ages you must take into consideration the stipulation 
made in open court to the effect that the plaintiff 
will grant the defendants the right of possession as 
provided in the stipulation until May 1, 1958, and 
will construct for the benefit of the defendants a 
fence, a road and a ditch, and will provide a perma-
nent right of way for the same to enable the defen-
dants to utilize 36.79 acres of remaining land. The 
fence, road and ditch will be constructed before the 
defendants' use of the present such facilities will be 
disrupted in the construction of the Weber Basin 
Project Works. The items of damage to remaining 
property are to be separately stated in the verdict." 
(Italics added.) 
This instruction correctly states the law and the ap-
pellant has not excepted to the giving of this instruction. 
We contend that this is a full answer to all matters con-
tained under appellant's Point II. 
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POINT III. 
ORAL INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT GIVEN IN · 
VIOLATION OF RULE 51 OF THE RULES OF 
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND ERROR CANNOT 
BE PREDICATED ON THE ADMONISHMENTS 
GIVEN THE JURY BY THE COURT. 
We cannot agree with appellant that oral instructions 
were given to the jury in this cause. Appellant in his argu-
ment under this point refers to the portions of the record 
quoted on pages six through fourteen of its brief. It would 
appear proper to analyze each of the "instructions" of the 
trial court as there quoted and determine their effect. 
On pages 6, 7 and the top half of page 8 of the brief 
of appellant the trial court is quoted in six instances all 
dealing with the question of benefit to the condemnor. In 
each instance, the trial court in answer to the question of 
the juror admonishes them that they may not consider 
benefit to the plaintiff condemnor in determining fair 
market value and advises the jury that the Court will de-
termine the law. By way of emphasis, may we quote again 
a part of the statement of the Court as printed at page 7 
of appellant's brief as follows: 
"If they (plaintiff) got some sand or gravel or 
something like that and it's worth a million dollars 
to them, it's none of your business, none of our busi-
ness." 
A part of Instruction No. 14, as actually given, reads 
as follows (R. 37) : 
"The compensation to be paid to the defendants 
John G. Braegger and Elsie L. Braegger, his wife, 
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cannot be measured by the value of the land to the 
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District but it 
' ' 
must ·be determined by the loss and damage to the 
said defendants. In other words, what the owner 
has lost is the measure, and not what the condemnor 
has gained." 
It occurs to us that the wrong party is complaining 
about the so-called oral instructions. That both the oral 
statements of the trial court and the written instrctions 
contain a correct statement of the applicable law must be 
admitted. The oral statements were, however, entirely for 
the benefit of the plaintiff and it should not be heard to 
complain. 
Continuing with an analysis of the questions and an-
swers as set out in appellant's brief, the remainder of page 
8 and all of pages 9, 10, 11 and 12, are devoted to questions 
and answers concerning income tax features of the award 
to be made to the defendants, the respondents here. A fair 
inference to be placed on the Court's answers is that he 
leaned over backwards to favor the plaintiff and to insure 
that no prejudice would result. That these statements were 
in the nature of admonishments to the jury is clear and the 
appellant could claim error only if the Court had refused 
to answer the jury's questions. 
And finally pages 13 and 14 concern questions by the 
jury and answers by the court as to sand and gravel and 
as to use of the word "adaptable." As a preliminary to this 
discussion, reference should be made to the prior action of 
the trial court in granting the appellant's motion to strike 
certain of the witness Capener's testimony as to the value 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11 
of land based upon the quantity of sand, gravel and fill 
dirt in it (R. 138). 
And,· prior to the question asked by the juror as ·quoted 
on page 13 of appellant's brief, the trial court had instructed 
the jury by means of written instructions and Instruction 
No. 14 (R. 37) contained this language, inter alia, "and 
all the uses for which it is most suitable and for which it 
is adapted." 
The granting of the motion. to strike the evidence as to 
v~l,ue based upon quantities of sand and gravel in place, the 
giving of Instruction No. 14 and the further statement of 
the trial court at page 341 of the record that has been fully 
quoted on page 3 of this brief, when considered together, 
were correct pronouncements and, under no stretch of the 
imagination, could they be said to be prejudicial to the 
appellant. 
And, finally, we do not believe that an exception to 
these alleged oral instructions can properly be noted on 
date some three weeks after the final date of trial and the 
verdict of the jury. If appellant were to properly attack 
the trial court's answers to the jurors' questions, it must 
do so timely so as to give that court an opportunity to cor-
rect the objection voiced. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully urge that the points raised by appellant 
on this appeal are without merit, that the trial of this cause 
was fairly conducted and that the verdict of the jury and 
the judgment on that verdict should be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GEORGE M. MASON, 
JOSEPH C. FOLEY, 
Attorneys for Respondtmts. 
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